
2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Main Committee I

Summary record of the 2nd meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 4 May 2015, at 10 a.m.

Chair: Mr. Román-Morey (Peru)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.15 a.m.

General exchange of views (*continued*)

1. **Ms. Thunborg** (Sweden), speaking on behalf of the Nordic countries, said that the outcome document of the 2015 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should focus on the fulfilment of all commitments made under the Treaty and during previous Review Conferences. Increasing international tension made it more urgent to achieve nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. All States parties should pursue policies that were compatible with the Treaty and the objective of a world without nuclear weapons. The Conference should call for the elimination of all strategic and non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons, and any reductions in stockpiles should be irreversible, verifiable and transparent.

2. The Nordic countries subscribed to the humanitarian perspective on nuclear weapons and recommended that the Conference should express its concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any nuclear weapons use. They also subscribed to the principle of effective disarmament. Accordingly, the Conference should emphasize that disarmament should be pursued unconditionally through multilateral, regional, bilateral or unilateral means. It was regrettable that the Conference on Disarmament had failed to produce tangible results. The Nordic countries called on it to resume work without delay on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The United Nations disarmament machinery as a whole should be used to pursue multilateral disarmament, especially at a time when the Conference on Disarmament remained stalled.

3. The ongoing implementation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New Start Treaty) was welcome, but both parties should make further and deeper cuts in their nuclear arsenals. Nuclear-weapon States should include non-strategic nuclear weapons in future disarmament agreements. The Review Conference should urge nuclear-weapon States to increase transparency regarding their nuclear arsenals, decrease the operational readiness of their nuclear weapons, and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their strategic doctrines. The Nordic

countries had submitted a working paper (NPT/CONF.2015/WP.15) containing all their recommendations for consideration by the Review Conference.

4. **Mr. Filipsons** (Latvia) said that finding a way forward on nuclear disarmament would be the main challenge for the current Review Conference. Unlike in the past, both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States were now an organic part of any nuclear disarmament discussions. A step-by-step approach would facilitate disarmament, strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty and preserve strategic balances. That approach should include the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, an end to the stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament, and a start to negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It was reassuring that multilateral disarmament had been high on the agenda of the recent meeting of the five permanent members of the Security Council, and the steps taken by those States to intensify the dialogue with non-nuclear-weapon States and increase cooperation on nuclear disarmament verification were welcome.

5. The action plan of the 2010 Review Conference contained a set of balanced and substantive steps and its goals remained relevant. The work of Main Committee I would be the most challenging, but there was nevertheless a need for a balanced discussion covering non-strategic nuclear weapons and reciprocal confidence-building and transparency measures. His Government was concerned that one State party had violated the terms of the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances by mistreating and exploiting Ukraine, a country which had made efforts to strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty by abandoning its nuclear arsenal and acceding to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State. Those actions eroded trust and undermined nuclear non-proliferation efforts.

6. **Ms. Chan Valverde** (Costa Rica) said that, five years after the adoption of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference, the fulfilment of nuclear disarmament commitments lagged far behind the fulfilment of commitments related to non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Yet, recent developments had highlighted the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any accidental or deliberate use of nuclear weapons, and some States,

including nuclear-weapon States, claimed that the security environment was not conducive to nuclear disarmament, and that a mere adjustment of the action plan would be sufficient for the Review Conference to be successful. However, the Review Conference needed to be a turning point with agreement on specific time-bound commitments.

7. Nuclear tests had been prohibited, but the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty had not yet entered into force. Similarly, attempts had been made to prohibit the production of fissile material, yet negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament remained paralysed. In spite of efforts to increase transparency and verifications by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), bilateral and unilateral verification processes remained the norm, and most reductions in nuclear weapons had affected only non-operational or stockpiled warheads. It was clear where the priorities lay, 45 years after the entry into force of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, given the disparity between the \$105 billion invested in nuclear weapons and the \$10 million annual budget of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs.

8. Compliance with article VI of the Treaty was not conditional or optional, it was mandatory. That fact was underlined by the renewed momentum behind the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, as demonstrated at the three international conferences on the topic held since 2010. The conference held in Vienna in 2014 had found that the infamous and outdated paradigm of nuclear deterrence entailed preparations for nuclear warfare even as nuclear-weapon States claimed that their goal was never to use those weapons. All the three conferences had also found that the capacity to respond to the detonation of a nuclear weapon had never existed, that the only guarantee of non-use was the elimination of nuclear weapons, and that there was a legal vacuum in the international framework for the prohibition of nuclear weapons. Costa Rica and the other States members of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States had therefore endorsed the pledge made by the Austrian Government at the Vienna conference.

9. The implementation of article VI of the Treaty should begin with a legally binding international instrument that stigmatized and prohibited nuclear weapons on the basis of their unacceptable consequences, thereby placing them on the same footing as other weapons of mass destruction banned

by specific treaties. That instrument would also close certain loopholes in the existing legal framework that allowed nuclear-weapon-related activities or enabled States to claim that the continued existence of nuclear weapons had benefits. The complete elimination of nuclear weapons was the only guarantee that they would never be used by States or non-State actors; a mere extension of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference or a step-by-step approach was not acceptable. The findings of the three international conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons should be incorporated into the outcome document of the current Review Conference. His country and the 159 States that advocated a ban on nuclear weapons because of their catastrophic humanitarian consequences considered such an inclusion to be a red line.

10. **Ms. Yparraguirre** (Philippines) said that progress on nuclear disarmament had continued to stall in spite of the increased awareness of the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons and the world's inability to deal with them adequately. Although her Government supported existing approaches to nuclear disarmament, nothing in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons required States parties to confine their efforts to those measures or set preconditions for disarmament actions. Article VI of the Treaty was clear about the need for an early-date cessation of the nuclear arms race and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under international control, but that need had not been fulfilled. The time was therefore ripe to agree on concrete actions, benchmarks and timelines.

11. A comprehensive nuclear weapons convention or a series of mutually reinforcing legal instruments with a credible verification system would, however, fulfil the article VI obligations. Her Government would push for such a convention and the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and for negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material. In the meantime, there was a need for a moratorium on nuclear testing and for security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

12. Nuclear-weapon States should adopt a non-first use of nuclear weapons policy to demonstrate their good faith pending progress with nuclear disarmament. No crises currently facing the international community should be invoked as justification for the cold war concept of deterrence. Instead, they should be

considered a reason to eliminate nuclear weapons in order to preclude their accidental or deliberate use. States should also work to establish zones free of nuclear weapons. Her Government was working with its partners in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to encourage the five permanent members of the Security Council to become parties to the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.

13. **Mr. Raja Zaib Shah** (Malaysia) said that, during the cold war, stability had been achieved through mutually assured destruction, but the current unipolar world had become less predictable, and doctrines that suggested that nuclear weapons could be used as a counterweight to conventional inferiority would lead the world into an unstable and dangerous future. Vertical proliferation continued to negate any reduction in the numbers of nuclear weapons, whose destructive power exceeded the capacity of any State or international organization to provide assistance. Some States had pursued nuclear weapons programmes in the false hope that they would provide security and power. There were also credible fears that non-State actors might use nuclear weapons to commit terrorist and other criminal acts. The time was therefore ripe for negotiations on a legally binding instrument banning nuclear weapons. Malaysia had always maintained a principled position on the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and advocated a multilateral process under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

14. Most of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference had not been implemented, thereby which jeopardized the future of the Treaty. The 2015 Review Conference was therefore an opportunity to set ambitious, realistic and time-bound targets for disarmament independently of the goals agreed upon in the areas of non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Nuclear disarmament could no longer be viewed as a work in progress and must complement the non-proliferation initiatives that were being pursued.

15. **Ms. Golberg** (Canada), speaking on behalf of the group of governmental experts on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, said that the consensus report adopted by the group would soon be submitted to the General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament. The report aimed to inform future negotiators of a treaty banning the production of fissile

material by outlining areas of convergence on key aspects of such a treaty and ways to address divergent perspectives. It also identified areas where future technical and scientific work could be done, and where confidence-building measures and evolutionary clauses could be developed.

16. The relationship between the scope, definitions and verification requirements of a future treaty and its associated legal obligations and institutional arrangements would be a dynamic one. The experts had had an open-minded and fact-based approach which had been a model of analysis and thoughtful multilateral dialogue. They had therefore been able to go beyond the sterile discussions that had characterized past debates on the treaty, resulting in a consensus that a legally binding, non-discriminatory and multilateral treaty should verifiably ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. The treaty should also apply equally to all States and be based on the principle of irreversibility.

17. There was a consensus that the Shannon Report and the mandate contained therein were the most suitable basis for future negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament. Furthermore, it had been agreed that the treaty obligations would be expressed in the form of prohibited as opposed to permitted activities. The group had also addressed the issue of whether, or to what extent, the scope of the treaty should include stocks of fissile material produced prior to its entry into force. Past production included civil stocks, naval fuel, stocks for nuclear weapons and fissile material declared by a State to be in excess of its weapons needs. That policy-neutral approach had fostered constructive discussions, including a useful dialogue between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States.

18. If the treaty was intended to achieve disarmament, its scope would have to be relatively broad and encompass at least some of the fissile material stocks of States parties. The experts had addressed the topic from a wide range of perspectives, covering future production to prevent an increase in the amount of fissile material assigned for use in nuclear weapons and aspects of past production of such material. They had also discussed whether treaty verification should include measures to prevent the diversion of material to weapons programmes.

19. The experts had agreed that definitions in the treaty should be scientifically accurate and tailored to the objectives of the treaty. Specifically, they should clarify treaty obligations while enabling implementation and verification. The experts had considered four different definitions for fissile material, but there was a consensus that highly enriched uranium and plutonium were the core materials that should be at the heart of any definition because of their weapons applicability.

20. The treaty's verification regime should encompass diversion risks and undeclared production and facilities. Challenges to effective verification included national security, non-proliferation and commercial concerns. The group had therefore explored a focused approach that would target enrichment and reprocessing activities, as well as a comprehensive approach covering a broader range of upstream and downstream activities. The verification toolbox would combine existing tools and techniques with other tools developed specifically for the treaty. In that regard, the group had benefited from briefings by representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.

21. The legal and institutional provisions of the treaty should draw on experiences with existing international treaties and place the future treaty within the broader international security context. The group had therefore made proposals on how to approach governance structures, duration, withdrawal, entry into force and compliance. The report of the group of governmental experts should be widely read so as to increase understanding of the key issues and generate political momentum. It was important for States to examine the entire report, not simply its recommendations. Negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material should remain a priority for the international community. The outcome document of the Review Conference should therefore reiterate the need for those negotiations to begin.

22. **Mr. Kmentt** (Austria) said that his delegation welcomed the reductions made by nuclear-weapon States in their nuclear arsenals and the proposals made for further cuts and increased dialogue. Those reductions, however, were often based primarily on obsolescence and stockpile management. His

delegation's understanding of article VI of the Treaty was that it required a clear determination to move away from nuclear weapons and to embrace practical and legal measures that were irreversible, legally binding and verifiable. Instead, nuclear-weapon States continued to modernize their nuclear weapon arsenals and to allocate resources to them. Such plans in turn posed a serious threat to the credibility of the Treaty.

23. Nuclear weapons and policies based on nuclear deterrence had become an end unto themselves rather than a temporary state until nuclear disarmament was achieved. That was a dangerous incitement for nuclear proliferation and thus further undermined the Treaty. A collective and determined move away from nuclear weapons, through strong non-proliferation measures and credible and urgent nuclear disarmament, was crucial. A growing understanding of the unacceptable humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and the risks associated with their mere existence provided the arguments and urgency for eliminating them once and for all.

24. His delegation had introduced a working paper ([NPT/CONF.2015/WP.30](#)) on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, on behalf of 15 countries, including his own, which provided an account of the developments on the topic in the past review cycle. It highlighted the growing international focus on the substantive aspects of the humanitarian initiative through joint cross-regional statements and the three international conferences, held in Norway, Mexico and Austria, on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. That focus constituted the main positive development of the past review cycle and as such should be reflected in the review part of the final document of the current Review Conference. The working paper also made a number of recommendations for inclusion in the forward-looking part of the final document.

25. His delegation had introduced another working paper ([NPT/CONF.2015/WP.29](#)) entitled "The Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons (8 and 9 December 2014) and the Austrian Pledge: Input for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons", which contained the substantive conclusions of the Chair's summary of that conference. The findings in respect of the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, the risks associated with the existence of those weapons, and the legal and

moral dimension of that weaponry constituted a powerful set of arguments that should lead to an urgent and profound change in the nuclear weapons debate. The working paper also contained the national pledge made by Austria based on the evidence presented in connection with the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. He welcomed the fact that over 70 States had supported the pledge to date and invited all other States to do the same; the Review Conference should establish a credible process to identify and pursue effective measures to fill the gap for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons, as required under article VI of the Treaty.

26. **Mr. Ahn** Young-jip (Republic of Korea) said that nuclear disarmament — a core element of the outcome of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference — remained crucial in order to reduce the risk of the accidental or intentional use of nuclear weapons. The three pillars of the Treaty should be pursued in a mutually reinforcing manner. Preserving the balance between nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation commitments was particularly vital to the credibility and integrity of the Treaty regime. While noting the unilateral reduction measures taken by France and the United Kingdom and the commitments made by the United States and Russia within the framework of the New START Treaty, his delegation urged nuclear-weapon States to take further steps towards disarmament. In particular, he looked forward to further reductions in the stockpiles of the United States and Russia in all categories of nuclear weapons.

27. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was undoubtedly an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament; nevertheless, there were growing differences between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States over the pace of progress made on the action plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)). Transparency and confidence-building measures were a prerequisite for achieving a world without weapons. He noted the progress reports submitted by the five nuclear-weapon States during the current review cycle and the efforts to develop a standard reporting form, and looked forward to even more detailed reports that built upon those efforts. The glossary of key nuclear terms, to be submitted to the Conference, was also a welcome development which would serve as a

foundation for future multilateral nuclear disarmament agreements. He hoped that the relevance of the ongoing process involving the five nuclear-weapon States would be supported by a workplan detailing the initiatives that they would pursue in the next Non-Proliferation Treaty review cycle.

28. He welcomed the joint initiative by the United Kingdom and Norway on the verification of warhead dismantlement and the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification, recently launched by the United States. Such initiatives provided a practical and durable framework for international cooperation in disarmament and thereby strengthened the Treaty regime. Proper negative security assurances by nuclear-weapon States might alleviate the security concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States. However, such assurances were not the automatic right of all non-nuclear-weapon States and should be applied only to those that complied with the Treaty.

29. The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was imperative in order to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. He called upon those States that had not yet done so, particularly the Annex 2 States, to ratify that Treaty without further delay. In June 2015, the Republic of Korea would host the meeting of the Group of Eminent Persons to facilitate its early entry into force.

30. The Republic of Korea also supported the commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (fissile material cut-off treaty). He welcomed the recently adopted report by the group of governmental experts containing recommendations on the possible aspects of such a treaty, and the draft treaty proposed by France. The momentum provided by such recent developments would hopefully contribute to genuine progress in the Conference on Disarmament and also have a positive influence on other forums.

31. **Ms. Anderson** (Canada) said that Canada had long supported a step-by-step approach to disarmament, with a view to fully implementing the commitments enshrined in article VI of the Treaty. Pragmatism was paramount: lack of progress in one area should not prevent the international community from seeking to advance others.

32. Recognition of the devastating humanitarian consequences of nuclear war underpinned her delegation's efforts to pursue practical and effective nuclear disarmament. Reducing and ultimately eliminating the risk of the use of nuclear weapons remained at the heart of the grand bargain that had constituted the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Any realistic prospect for progress required taking into account both the humanitarian and the security dimensions of nuclear weapons. The strategic security context and the practical challenges facing disarmament must be borne in mind. Nuclear-weapon States had to be actively engaged in the disarmament process and international trust must be reinforced. The international community needed to ensure that international security and stability would be maintained as stockpiles were drawn down and eventually eliminated.

33. Nuclear-weapon States should continue to take steps to reduce the number of their strategic and non-strategic weapons and their reliance on them in their security doctrines. The implementation of the New START Treaty and recent unilateral reductions undertaken by the United Kingdom and France were positive steps in that regard; however, further reductions were needed. Canada and its partners of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative had made proposals for furthering the goal of reducing the alert levels and reliance on nuclear weapons. She hoped that such proposals could be incorporated into the final document of the current Review Conference. She strongly encouraged nuclear-weapon States to increase the quantity, quality, relevance and frequency of their transparency efforts, in line with actions 5 and 21 of the action plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference.

34. The final report of the group of governmental experts on a fissile material cut-off treaty offered a comprehensive review of the multiple and interrelated aspects of such a treaty. States should now decide how to use the report and initiate the negotiations to which all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty had been committed under action 15 of the 2010 action plan. While Canada continued to believe that the Conference on Disarmament was the most appropriate forum in which to negotiate a treaty, it was not the only one. The time had come for States parties to decide whether support for negotiations exclusively in the Conference on Disarmament was worth the price of an indefinite delay in starting those negotiations.

35. A verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty was the only way to ensure that fissile materials were no longer produced for nuclear weapons. Pending substantive negotiations on such a treaty, her delegation called on the one nuclear-weapon State that had not yet done so to unequivocally declare a moratorium on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. Such a demonstration of commitment to disarmament would help to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons.

36. Another important element for the elimination of nuclear weapons was the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Canada continued to play an active role in encouraging further signatures and ratifications of that Treaty with a view to its entry into force and its universal application. She called on all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty that had not yet done so to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty swiftly and without conditions. While the international community awaited the final eight ratifications needed for its entry into force, Canada also called on all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to work with the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in order to complete its robust verification system. That included completing all stations that were planned as part of the International Monitoring System and contributing to the development of the Organization's on-site inspection capabilities.

37. The current Review Conference was an opportunity to assess implementation of commitments made at past Review Conferences, notably those of 2000 and 2010. Main Committee I and the Review Conference as a whole should seek to identify ways to strengthen the implementation of the commitments already made and to build upon them in the outcome to the Review Conference.

38. **Mr. Motta** (Brazil) said that non-compliance with article VI of the Treaty remained the biggest hurdle to full implementation of the Treaty and to the attainment of a world free of nuclear weapons. The current implementation gap between nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation obligations had become unsustainable and the so-called step-by-step approach had failed. Notwithstanding some welcome efforts, effective progress remained elusive. Reductions in nuclear arsenals, especially when carried out in the context of modernization programmes and

vertical proliferation, could not be considered as nuclear disarmament. Full compliance with article VI would only be achieved through transparent, verified and irreversible disarmament measures. To that end, a comprehensive convention on disarmament should be negotiated, with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States. The task of the current Review Conference was to progress towards that goal with concrete commitments on nuclear disarmament.

39. In its final document, the Review Conference should express its deep concern at the continued risk posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the potential catastrophic humanitarian consequences of their use. It should welcome the successful convening of the three conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons and urge all States parties to put humanitarian consequences at the centre of the disarmament debate in all disarmament-related forums, including the General Assembly. The Conference should affirm that nuclear disarmament and other related measures should be pursued within a multilaterally agreed legal framework with specified timelines; it should also welcome efforts to develop the nuclear disarmament verification capabilities required to ensure compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for a nuclear-weapon-free world, and should underscore the central role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in that process.

40. The final document should welcome the adoption of General Assembly resolutions 68/32 and 69/58 on follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament and urge all States parties to implement them, particularly with regard to the urgent commencement of negotiations on a comprehensive convention on nuclear disarmament, and to the convening, no later than 2018, of a United Nations high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament to review progress made in that regard. The final document should also recall the five-point proposal for nuclear disarmament by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and welcome new initiatives from Government and civil society, including the pledge by the Austrian Government and the proposal presented by the Cuban delegation at the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, held in December 2014, for the adoption in 2018 of a convention on nuclear disarmament.

41. Pending the conclusion of negotiations on nuclear disarmament, the current Review Conference should urge nuclear-weapon States and States parties that were members of regional alliances based on the use of nuclear weapons to take effective steps to diminish and ultimately eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their security doctrines; should request nuclear-weapon States to refrain from carrying out either quantitative or qualitative improvements to their nuclear arsenals, as such actions ran counter to the Treaty's objectives; and urge nuclear-weapon States to commit to report annually on their implementation of disarmament-related actions contained in the action plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference, and to provide, no later than at the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference, a time frame for their implementation.

42. Finally, the current Conference should renew its support for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, recall the endorsement by the 2010 Review Conference of practical steps in a process leading to the full implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and, while noting efforts undertaken to date, express concern regarding the lack of implementation of those steps.

43. **Mr. Korhonen** (Finland) said that no State's security should be based on nuclear or any other weapons of mass destruction. Working towards a world free of such weapons was the responsibility of all nations. The elimination of nuclear weapons would be possible only through substantive and constructive engagement with nuclear-weapon States. Although the efforts of such States to reduce their nuclear arsenals, including through the New Start Treaty, were welcome, it was vitally important for the United States and the Russian Federation to make further reductions in both strategic and non-strategic nuclear arsenals, and all nuclear weapons should be brought under a legally binding and verifiable international system.

44. The first steps towards such a system should include further transparency, information exchanges and other confidence-building measures. In addition, to boost confidence in the Treaty regime, nuclear-weapon States should comply with their obligations under article VI of the Treaty and should engage in good-faith negotiations on further nuclear disarmament measures. In that connection, his delegation welcomed

the coordination, transparency and confidence-building efforts of the five nuclear-weapon States that were parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and such initiatives as the glossary of key nuclear terms. It further welcomed the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament as an important confidence-building measure among the major nuclear-weapon States and a number of non-nuclear-weapon States.

45. The recent slow pace of nuclear disarmament was unfortunate, especially as the urgent need for it was only growing, as highlighted by the three conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. As long as such weapons existed, there was a real threat of catastrophe with immeasurable human and humanitarian costs. The Non-Proliferation Treaty should be at the centre of that debate, as the humanitarian aspect was fundamental to it. It was important to continue seeking common ground on that issue. The two humanitarian statements made during the general debate of the current Review Conference were complementary and mutually reinforcing. Given the enormous support both had received, the Conference might consider combining the two statements as an effective way to increase unity in the group of States supporting the humanitarian argument.

46. The stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament was cause for concern. In order to make that body a modern negotiation forum, its members should review its working methods and consider its enlargement and the participation of civil society. Finland attached great importance to the prompt initiation of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, as an indispensable step towards nuclear disarmament. He welcomed the report issued by the group of governmental experts, which was expected to lay the groundwork for future efforts on such a treaty. As a member of the Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Finland underlined the urgency of the entry into force of that Treaty. Lastly, civil society should be an integral part of disarmament and non-proliferation discussions in all forums.

47. **Mr. Sun** Lei (China) said that China firmly pursued peace for development, implemented an open, transparent and responsible nuclear policy, faithfully fulfilled its nuclear disarmament obligations under the Treaty, and advocated the comprehensive prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons. Its nuclear strategy was one of self-defence, to respond to possible nuclear attacks that would endanger its national

security. China had never threatened and would never threaten or target any State with its nuclear weapons; had kept its commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones under any circumstances; and called on other nuclear-weapon States to do the same. It vigorously promoted the conclusion of a multilateral treaty among nuclear-weapon States in that respect as a practical measure for nuclear disarmament.

48. China did not provide a nuclear umbrella for other States, nor did it deploy nuclear weapons on the soil of other States or engage in a nuclear arms race in any form. It always kept its nuclear force at the minimum level required to ensure its national security, and called on all nuclear-weapon States to do the same, and for the practice of nuclear-sharing to be abolished. It had signed and ratified the protocols to the treaties on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Latin America and the Caribbean, the South Pacific and Africa; had recently ratified the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia; and hoped to sign, as soon as possible, the Protocol to the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. It called upon nuclear-weapon States to support non-nuclear-weapon States in their efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones and to take up legally binding obligations in that respect.

49. China supported the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which it was in the process of ratifying. In the meantime, nuclear-weapon States should continue to honour their commitment to the nuclear test moratorium. His country also supported the early initiation of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty in the Conference on Disarmament, and had participated in the work of the group of governmental experts on such a treaty.

50. China had actively conducted research in verification measures and related technical tools for nuclear arms control and had issued white papers laying out its nuclear strategy and nuclear capability development policy. It had also engaged with the other four nuclear-weapon States parties in dialogue and consultations with respect to confidence-building measures and the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The agreement reached in the working group on nuclear technology, led by China, on the first draft of the nuclear glossary,

was a significant achievement by the mechanism of the five nuclear-weapon States parties and would play an important role in enhancing understanding and mutual trust.

51. To achieve the international stability necessary for progress on nuclear disarmament, parties should uphold a new security concept based on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination, full respect and accommodation of the legitimate security concerns of States, the settlement of international disputes peacefully through dialogue, and the pursuit of comprehensive, universal and sustainable security through cooperation.

52. Nuclear disarmament should be promoted gradually. Nuclear-weapon States should fulfil their obligations under article VI of the Treaty and undertake not to seek to possess nuclear weapons indefinitely. The countries with the largest nuclear arsenals bore special and primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament. They should continue to drastically reduce their nuclear stockpiles through verifiable, irreversible and legally binding means. When conditions allowed, other nuclear-weapon States should join the multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiation process.

53. The role of nuclear weapons in national security policy should be effectively reduced. All necessary precautions should be taken to avoid the accidental or unauthorized launching of nuclear weapons. The principles of global strategic balance and stability and of undiminished security for all must be upheld; the development and deployment of missile defence systems must be abandoned; and the multilateral negotiations process on the non-weaponization of outer space and the prevention of an arms race in outer space must be promoted. Lastly, his delegation had submitted working papers to the current Conference and hoped that the recommendations contained in those papers would be fully reflected in the final document of the Conference.

54. **Mr. Najafi** (Iran) said that current facts, figures and realities suggested that, over the past 70 years, not only had the demand for nuclear disarmament not declined, but it had significantly grown. Recently, international efforts in that field had intensified. The increase in the number of States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was a great achievement. However, the failure to achieve its

universalization remained a serious challenge to its effectiveness.

55. The incomplete, selective and discriminatory implementation of the Treaty's provisions was yet another challenge, but the main challenge was the lack of real progress by all nuclear-weapon States in fulfilling their nuclear disarmament obligations under article VI and the breach by certain nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty, including through their nuclear-weapon-sharing policies and their direct or indirect assistance to non-States parties in developing nuclear weapons.

56. The lack of substantive progress in the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and related decisions, including the 13 practical steps for nuclear disarmament and the action plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty ([NPT/CONF.2010/50](#) (Vol. I)), were other sources of concern that had regrettably deepened the already existing frustration of the non-nuclear-weapon States about the lack of political will on the part of nuclear-weapon States.

57. Although nuclear arsenals had been reduced over the years, most of the warheads involved had only been moved from operational status to the reserve, inactive or contingency categories, and therefore continued to exist and had not actually been dismantled. In addition, the total yield of nuclear arsenals had increased and was no longer measured in kilotons, but in megatons, as atomic bombs had been replaced by much more destructive hydrogen bombs. Furthermore, despite reduction efforts by certain nuclear-weapon States, all nuclear-weapon possessors continued to modernize or upgrade their nuclear weapon arsenals, and certain nuclear-weapon States had plans to develop new types of such weapons. The role of nuclear weapons in military doctrines had also not diminished, and the development of new types of tactical nuclear weapons reduced the threshold for, and increased the possibility of, their use.

58. Contrary to the explicit obligations under articles I and II of the Treaty, nuclear-sharing continued to take place between nuclear-weapon States or between those States and their non-nuclear-weapon counterparts, seriously undermining the object and purpose of the Treaty and challenging its effectiveness and credibility.

Current negative security assurances were very limited, conditional, insufficient, and, above all, could be used to justify the use of nuclear weapons to defend the vital interests of a nuclear-weapon State or its allies and partners.

59. The current Review Conference should take concrete action to rectify the current situation with respect to nuclear disarmament. To that end, the Islamic Republic of Iran had submitted a working paper (NPT/CONF.2015/WP.41) in which it proposed a number of elements for incorporation into the final document of the Conference. While his country stood ready to constructively cooperate with other delegations to agree on a substantive document, it insisted on having a time frame for the implementation of any possible decision or action on nuclear disarmament.

60. **Mr. Mati** (Italy) said that the 2010 action plan remained an essential basis upon which States parties could build future deliberations. However, further efforts were needed for its comprehensive, balanced and full implementation. Any further progress on the implementation of the Treaty should be based on the consideration that its three pillars were mutually reinforcing. The promotion of international stability, based on the principle of undiminished security for all, and the full implementation of non-proliferation obligations were critical components for achieving the goals of the Treaty. Disarmament could not be detached from non-proliferation.

61. While sharing the concerns about the catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons, Italy believed that effective, verifiable and irreversible nuclear disarmament should be pursued through a step-by-step or building-block approach. Italy would continue to contribute to efforts to achieve a safer world for all without nuclear weapons, focusing on common ground, and therefore supported the statement made by the Australian delegation on behalf of a large group of like-minded countries. It was also contributing constructively to the current debate by organizing a workshop, entitled “Nuclear Weapons and Human Security”, to examine that topic under the lens of international law.

62. Italy was represented in the group of governmental experts on a fissile material cut-off treaty and welcomed the successful outcome of the group’s work. Following the in-depth discussions held

the previous year in the Conference on Disarmament, the time was ripe for an early commencement of negotiations in that body, and Italy welcomed the French proposal concerning a draft treaty as constructive and meaningful. Such a treaty would be crucial to fostering both disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. In the meantime, Italy continued to support the moratorium on the production of fissile material.

63. The recently launched International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification was an innovative initiative involving both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States, and Italy intended to be fully engaged in it by making available all its relevant expertise. There were welcome indications of progress in implementing the New START Treaty by the Russian Federation and the United States; nonetheless, both countries should seek further reductions in their nuclear arsenals, including their strategic, non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed weapons.

64. Italy appreciated the holding of nuclear-weapon States conferences on the follow-up to the 2010 Review Conference and their concrete deliverables, such as the glossary of key nuclear terms of the five nuclear-weapon States parties, and other nuclear activities and discussions aimed at building mutual trust and transparency. It supported the prompt entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which would strengthen the international non-proliferation regime and significantly contribute to the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. Pending that event, there should be a comprehensive moratorium on nuclear weapons tests.

65. Lastly, it was important to remember that nuclear base arrangements such as those of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had already been in place when the Treaty entered into force in 1970. They had been made clear to negotiating delegations and announced to the public, and were fully compatible with the Treaty obligations of NATO allies.

66. **Ms. Higgie** (New Zealand) said that the Treaty should not be imperilled, as it had delivered significant benefit to all, especially in terms of constraining horizontal nuclear proliferation. States parties must chart the course of their future work to reinforce the Treaty’s standing and bona fides. At the current turning point in the life of the Treaty, it was important to

reframe and widen the key issues under discussion within the Treaty process and to focus on specific proposals for elaborating the legally effective measures required. In its working paper [NPT/CONF.2015/WP.9](#), the New Agenda Coalition, of which her country was a member, had put forward two legally distinct approaches for the implementation of article VI: a stand-alone agreement, or a series or framework of agreements. Either pathway would advance implementation of article VI and would be fully compatible with the object and purpose of the Treaty.

67. The task of exploring legal approaches that could advance effective measures for nuclear disarmament had acquired added urgency given the compelling and unassailable evidence that had emerged regarding the risks and the catastrophic humanitarian impact of any nuclear weapon detonation. That evidence highlighted the urgent need for the fulfilment of obligations and undertakings under the Treaty and its Review Conferences, in particular the full implementation of article VI.

68. **Mr. Rosnes** (Norway) said that the three international conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons held in 2013 and 2014 had successfully raised awareness of the risks and consequences of a nuclear weapon detonation. His delegation had submitted a working paper on the conference held in Oslo and its main findings ([NPT/CONF.2015/WP.27](#)), which had revealed that it was unlikely that any State or international body could adequately address the humanitarian emergency that would be brought about by the detonation of a nuclear weapon; that nuclear weapons generated both immediate and long-term effects; and that the destructive effects of nuclear weapons would not be constrained by national borders.

69. His delegation and that of the United Kingdom had also submitted another working paper ([NPT/CONF.2015/WP.31](#)), which underlined that since the 2010 Review Conference, a compelling body of evidence had heightened awareness of the risks that would persist until such time as nuclear weapons were eliminated. His delegation expected the humanitarian perspective on nuclear weapons to be reflected in the outcome of the present Review Conference. His country would continue its efforts within the context of the United Kingdom-Norway Initiative on nuclear warhead dismantlement, and warmly welcomed the

launch of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification.

70. **Mr. Mashabane** (South Africa) said that while significant progress had been made on non-proliferation, the disarmament pillar of the Treaty had yet to be realized. Among the areas where progress had been lacking were the number of nuclear weapons stationed outside the territories of nuclear-weapon States, the reliance on nuclear weapons in military and security doctrines, and the number of nuclear warheads on high-alert status. Reductions of stockpiles from cold war levels were welcome, but were no substitute for concrete, transparent, irreversible and verifiable disarmament measures.

71. The value of reductions had also been offset by the development of new categories of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. When his country had agreed to the indefinite extension of the treaty in 1995, it had not agreed to the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons. In a world where so many lived in abject poverty, it was unacceptable that vast resources were being diverted towards the modernization of nuclear arsenals. His delegation recommended that the Review Conference should reaffirm the 1995 decision on principles and objectives for future nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, and the action plan approved at the 2010 Review Conference. He urged nuclear-weapon States to adopt specific timelines and benchmarks for disarmament.

72. His country was pleased to be among the vast majority of States that supported the humanitarian consequences initiative. South Africa had long advocated closing the legal gap in article VI through a systematic and progressive approach to nuclear disarmament that included a framework agreement providing for a set of mutually reinforcing instruments. Some States complained that such proposals were not practical or realistic, but if those States were truly committed to the effective measures towards disarmament called for in article VI, it was unclear why they would be reluctant to engage in discussion. The Treaty could not succeed if it focused on the security interests of only a few States. The belief that nuclear weapons could guarantee security amounted to incitement to proliferate. Some States could not argue that nuclear weapons were essential to their security without expecting other States to do the same.

73. **Mr. Schmid** (Switzerland) said that the most recent review cycle had seen an increased understanding of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. The three international conferences held on the topic had concluded that there was no way to satisfactorily address the aftermath of a nuclear weapon detonation. The humanitarian dimension had become a unifying factor that made States parties more inclined to work more resolutely and systematically towards a world free of nuclear weapons. The Review Conference must address the risks of the use of nuclear weapons due to miscalculation or error, including the possible exposure of command and early-warning networks to cyberattacks.

74. The Final Documents of the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences should serve as the road map for the implementation of article VI. His delegation welcomed the significant reductions in stockpiles made by some nuclear-weapon States, and the signing and ratification of protocols to nuclear-weapon-free zone agreements. However, slow progress on disarmament-related items in the 2010 action plan was cause for concern. Despite significant reductions from cold war levels, nuclear capacities existed that could destroy the planet many times over, and the motivations behind efforts to modernize nuclear arsenals appeared not to be in conformity with the Treaty's objectives. Further reductions of all types of nuclear weapons were required during the next review cycle.

75. He welcomed continued implementation of the New START Treaty. Other arms-control agreements, such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty should be preserved, and the Review Conference should give the Russian Federation and the United States of America added impetus to enter into negotiations for deeper cuts in all types of nuclear weapons. However, there had been no real progress on nuclear doctrines and no substantial reduction in operational readiness since the De-Alerting Group had first tabled a General Assembly resolution in that regard in 2007.

76. The submission for the first time of reports by nuclear-weapon States in 2014 was a welcome development. However, those States needed to increase transparency by providing baseline numbers and regular updates on their systems. It was important to close the legal gap that made nuclear weapons the only weapons of mass destruction that had not yet been

prohibited. The Review Conference should advance the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the commencement of negotiations for a fissile material cut-off treaty.

77. **Mr. Eloumni** (Morocco) said that the final document of the Review Conference should underline that it was not acceptable that nuclear weapons remained the only weapons of mass destruction not prohibited by an international instrument. The starting point for any credible and sustainable nuclear disarmament was the fulfilment of existing obligations. The Review Conference must reaffirm all previously agreed measures, including the 2010 action plan. It should acknowledge the efforts made by nuclear-weapon States, while insisting that reductions in nuclear arsenals should be more substantive and irreversible. It should also address the need for specified timetables against which progress could be assessed. Verification was a sensitive issue, but there was no reason why disarmament obligations should not be subject to the same verification obligations as the non-proliferation and peaceful uses pillars. One option would be for the Review Conference to establish an open-ended working group to consider measures for transparency and verification in nuclear disarmament.

The meeting rose at 1.00 p.m.